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INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY IN ISSUES IN PENSION SYSTEM
REFORMS COUNTRY EXPERIENCES AND POLICY OPTIONS
BY
DR. IYABODE MASHA*
In this study, the pension in Nigeria, Tunisia and Zambia are examined against the
background of the experiences of OECD and Latin American countries. The main finding is
that pension systems in African countries suffer from poor institutional framework, limited
scope of financial markets, and macroeconomic instability. In reforming pension systems, the
fiscal and financial sector implications need to be efficiently managed in a sound regulatory
framework so as to achieve the objectives of income growth and redistribution. The fiscal
implication arises from the potential effect of a reformed system on government's recurrent
expenditure on wages and transfers, as well as government's reliance on the mandatory
purchase of treasury instruments by pension funds. The financial sector effect arises from the
financial deepening that usually accompanies efficient and successful pension reforms. It is
argued that the challenge that faces African countries is how to build and sustain the
institutional capacity necessary to make pension reform successful. A gradual approach that
starts from the building of fiscal and macroeconomic viability, technical, institutional and
administrative capacity, while at the same time reforming existing system along the line of
multi-pillar, defined contribution, funded system is recommended.

INTRODUCTION
The focus of this paper is on building and sustaining the institutional capacity for
successful pension reform, particularly in African countries. In this regard, it is a
contribution to the burgeoning debate on how African takes care of its old. The
problem of old-age poverty is rarely the focus of policy in African countries, mainly
because of the low life expectancy. However, changes in demographic trends,
occasioned by better health facilities, suggest that a greyer population is in the making.
In addition, recent macroeconomic reforms and public sector downsizing has
pushed pension reforms to the forefront of social policy agenda. Therefore, it
becomes necessary to direct research to issues that affect the maturing population,
*Dr. Iyabode Masha is a Principal Economist in the Research Department, CBN.
An earlier version of this paper was published in Labbas (2000). Many thanks to partcipants at a CAFRAD/AP!
workshop in Tangiers, Morocco for comments and suggestions on the initial draft.

30
both in order to understand the dynamics of poverty in the society as well as be able to
make relevant policy prescriptions.
Some of society's most vulnerable groups can be found in the ranks of the old. In
most African countries, only a small percentage of the old is taken care of through
pension income accumulated while working in the formal sector. The larger majority
relies on traditional safety nets, having spent their working life outside the formal
sector. Pension reforms have important implications for poverty alleviation because
pension income is a major link to the two main approaches to poverty alleviation,
namely, economic growth and income redistribution. The experiences of emerging
economies suggest that sizeable reduction in poverty is often achieved through the use
of policies that stimulate growth and employment. With employment, income is
provided for the poor, and with redistribution of income, those who benefit directly
from the growth in employment are taken care of.
This paper examines the pension system of Nigeria, Tunisia and Zambia against
the experiences of some OECD and Latin American countries. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. In Section II, theoretical and institutional issues in pension policy
are analyzed. Section III discusses the experiences of Nigeria, Tunisia and Zambia,
while Section IV reviews international experiences in France, Japan, UK, USA,
Argentina and Chile. The paper concludes in Section V. The main questions to be
answered are:

* What should be the proper framework for the operation of pension schemes
*

*
*

in African countries?.
In the absence of pension coverage, what poverty alleviation policies can
be pursued for the benefit of the informal sector ?
What should be the proper role of government?
How should African countries build the capacity that will sustain whatever
reforms are put in place?
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THEORETICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL. ISSUES IN PENSION SYSTEM
REFORMS
Pension reform debates often revolve around the mode of financing, benefit
administration and the regulatory framework. The debate has been largely informed by
the changes in demographic trend in advanced countries, which affect the fiscal
equilibrium in pension funds. In general, the major issues of consideration in the
design of pension schemes are income replacement and redistribution, fiscal and
actuarial viability and efficiency.
Financing of pension plans is often based on a choice between defined
contributions and general revenue finani;ing. Sometimes, the expected benefit becomes
an issued in the choice of financing method. It has been argued for example, that flat
rate benefits should be financed from general revenue, since benefits are not
dependent on income levels. Earnings related benefits, on the other hand, depend on
the level of contribution. Under the first options, the twin objectives of pension
income i.e income replacement and redistribution are satisfied. In reality, most public
pension systems are a mixture to the two forms of financing, though they may differ in
the manner of funding.
In fully funded schemes (which all defined contribution plans are) contributions
are invested and benefits linked to asset performance. Pay As You Go (PAYG) scheme
on the other hand, finances current pension obligations from current contributions
and/ or budget transfers. The advantage of a PAYG system is that benefits are available
for distribution in a start-up pension programme, and it improves solidarity amongst
generations. Funded systems lack that element of redistribution. In addition, in an
economy that lacks macroeconomic stability, capital markets may not be sufficiently
developed to handle long-term investments efficiently. This applies very much to
African countries, where the markets are limited in scope and the economies are in a
state of flux, with wild swings in interest and inflation rates. Such volatility may not be
conducive for long-term investments.
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FIGURE 1: DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS. CIRCA EARLY 1990's
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Data Source: World Bank (1994)
Benefit administration is often determined through a statutory retirement age
and a minimum contribution period. In countries with older population like the OECD
countries (see Figure l) retirement age is usually in the early to mid 60's. However, in
African countries with younger population and lower life expectancy, retirement age
can be as low as 45 in some cases. Some countries have different age requirements for
males and females, based on the assumption that women have higher life expectancy,
and are expected to draw pension income for longer period than men.
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FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION OVER 60 YEARS: 1990 - 2050
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4.4
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23.1
8.9

Data Source: World Bank (1994)

The demographic make-up of a country has important implications for fiscal
equilibrium in a pension system because a high percentage of older population means
larger pension expenditure. In addition, the ratio of older people to working age people
or old age dependency ratio is important for the determination of financial equilibrium
in unfunded schemes. Public pension scheme in advanced countries have been under
considerable pressure in recent times because of the demographic transition pattern,
which results in an increasing ratio of older to younger persons as fertility and
mortality rates decline. Demographic projections for African countries suggest that
this will be the trend as health facilities and general quality of life improve (see
Figure 2).
Most pensions are indexed to the minimum wage or the inflation rate. The
importance of indexation lies in the fact that if pensions are fixed in nominal terms,
their real value declines at inflation times. In the absence of indexation and with high
inflation rate, most pensioners slip to below the poverty line. This is more so in Africa
where ab initio, benefits are low and the macroeconomic environment is unstable.
The role of government vis-a-vis the private sector is a major issue in pension
reform. In countries with well developed pension schemes, the system is made up of a
general publicly administered mandatory plan with universal coverage of the working
population, a second pillar of occupational schemes and a third pillar made up of
personal savings and investments, some of which are linked to income tax benefits. In
most countries of Africa, coverage in the occupational scheme is very limited, mainly
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because the majority of the laboµr force is either employed in the informal sector or is
in the non-wage economy. Except for countries like Tunisia, very few countries have
extensive publicly managed systems.,Most have a provident fund system, and some,
like Nigeria, have converted from provident fund to the social insurance system. Some
occupational plans and private pension investment exist, though they are limited in
scope.

FIGURE 3: THE PENSION PYRAMID

(Savings, Investment based)

OCCUPATIONAL SCHEMES
(Work and profession based, with portability)

GENERALSCHEME
(Often publicly-mandated and publicly funded, mandatory
participation and linked to social security)
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Support system in the absence of formal pension is extensive in Africa. The key
basis of income support in old age is the exte-nded family. Children often bear the .
responsibility of providing for their aged parents and siblings on a regular basis. A
study of the old in Nigeria stated that 97 percent of the urban old and 93 percent of the
rural old reported receiving financial and material assistance from family or kin
(Ekpeyong et al, 1986).
In addition to the extended family system, community organisations often
develop in the urban areas, and these contribute money to provide some infrastructure
in their home communities especially during their annual homecoming festival. There
are also organizations based on religious ties, which provide for the poor through
voluntary contributions and services. Muslims often take care of the poor through
Zakat, a religious tax earmarked for the needy, and Sadak'a, a substantial donation
decided by and for the purpose determined by the donor.
Though traditional systems work well in the absence of market based
alternatives, as in the case of those outside the formal economy; there is nothing
systematic about them, so income redistribution from the rich to the poor cannot be
efficiently handled within the framework. In addition, the income transferred may not
be enough, and in any case there is no certainty. Moreover, as society becomes more
differentiated and complex, such systems cannot be expected to survive. However, to
the extent that they contribute significantly to the reduction of old age poverty, and
given the impossibility of integrating certain segments into the formal economy, they
will continue to be relied upon. They could be integrated into reforms in the short
term, with a view to formalizing as the labour marked condition changes.
The regulation of pension schemes has become a major issue as the movement
towards privately provided pension plans started gaining momentum. Supervision of
most public plans falls under a department of government, and with the more dominant
role being played by pension funds in the mobilization of saving and investment,
extensive regulations are the norm in most countries. Chile's privately managed
pension system is one of the most regulated in the world. Some regulations are
designed to provide participants with the best information about pension funds. While
others are to prevent pension funds from engaging in speculative investments.
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Considering the constraints under which existing plans are operating, if the use of
private pension providers becomes extensive in African countries, only few will have
the technical and administrative capacity to supervise and regulate efficiently.
The foregoing review of institutional issues in pension reform has important
implication for the reform of pension systems in African countries. Countries will
have to choose the type of funding, benefit administration and regulatory framework
that best suits their current level of development, demographic make-up and labour
market conditions. These are by no means easy choices, but with the benefit of the
experience of advanced countries, informed decisions can be taken.

THE EXPERIENCE OF NIGERIA, TUNISIA AND ZAMBIA
In this section the experience of Nigeria, Tunisia and Zambia is examined. Though
all the countries have scheme that offer survivorship and disability benefits in addition
to pension, the focus here is on pension only. The state of the pension system in these
countries reflects their colonial heritage and peculiar socio-economic circumstance.
For example, Tunisia like most North African countries with a long history of
association with European markets, has a well developed social security system with
comprehensive coverage. On the other hand, Nigeria and Zambia have relatively
underdeveloped systems, mainly because their systems arose out of the need to
provide for the small crop of expatriate working in the former colonies. A detailed
description of each country follows.

NIGERIA
Structure: The pension system in Nigeria is very fragmented, with no single
coordinating body for all the pension plans. In the government sector, the Federal Civil
Service has a pension scheme that was non-contributory until 1996, as it was financed
from the general revenue. Each of the quasi-government organizatiom1,.autonomous
units such as the Central Bank, the Railway Corporation, utility companies,
universities, research institutes, the Ports Authority have their separate pension plan.
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The 36 State governments and local government authorities each administer
pension plans, mostly treated as expenditure items in the annual budget. In the private
sector, the only general pension plan available is the National Social Insurance Trust
Fund (NSITF), formerly know as the Nigeria Provident Fund. In addition, there are
company-administered, privately managed schemes in a fairly large section of the
formal private sector. Most of these schemes are negotiated between management and
unions, and some of them are non-contributory. Finally, some companies recently
commenced the operation of private pension investment. In all, the NSITF estimates
that there are more than 500 pension schemes in Nigeria.

Coverage: Public sector-based plans cover all employees in the Federal civil service,
quasi-government corporations, government parastatals, state and local governments
pension plans. In addition, government autonomous units were directed to cease
membership of the Federal Civil Service Pension plan. The NSITF estimates that the
combined public sector pension scheme, including those of autonomous agencies has
a current working membership of about 3,000,000 and existing pensioners number
over 1,000,000. Private sector based plans include the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust
Fund, membership of which is mandatory for companies with 5 or more workers.
Self-employed persons join voluntarily, while public servants, and aliens covered
under equivalent foreign programmed are exempted from participation. From 1961
when the NPF was established to the beginning of 1994 when the assets were
inherited by the NSITF, there were 5,680,475 cumulative members. In addition to the
NSITF, there are self-administered company based scheme in most parts of the formal
private sector. Employer sponsored retirement schemes are estimated to have about
2.5 million members. The combined membership of private and public plans is
estimated to be about 7 million, less than 7 percent of a labour force of 47 million.
Funding: In January 1996, contribution for those who joined the service after January
1993 became mandatory. However, the payment of pension and gratuity to federal and
state civil servants continues to be charge out the consolidated revenue. Some
autonomous organisations, research institutes and educational institutes have funded
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schemes with private insurance cpmpanies. For the NSITF, contribution is 2.5 percent
from employee and 5 percent from the employer on the first 48,000.00. Naira (about
$600.00) for annual basic salary. There is no standard or uniform contribution in
company based plans, as the contributions of employers and employees are usually
negotiated internally. They are usually comparable with what obtains in the public
services, but because wages are considerable higher, they are deemed more generous.

Eligibility Requirement: To be eligible for benefits in the public service, an
employee must have served for at least 5 years in the case of lump-sum benefits and at
least 10 years for pensionable income. Voluntary retirement age is 45 years, while
compulsory retirement age of 60 years or 35 years of service, whichever comes first,
except in the judicial services where the age ranges from 62-65 years. The eligibility
requirements are similar in most of the quasi-government organizations. Participants
in the NSITF who have reached a retirement age of 60 years, have 120 months of
contribution and are retired from regular employment qualify for a retirement grant
and a monthly pension income. A member -who has reached retirement age and has no
less than 12 months of contribution qualifies for lump-sum retirement grant.
Benefits: The public service retirement benefits are a lump-sum gratuity and pension
for qualifiers. Employees with more than 5 years but less than 10 years of services
obtain a lump sum payment of between 100 percent to 140 percent of terminal salary.
Employees with 10 - 35 years of service obtain a lump-sum payment of between
100-300 percent of final terminal salary, and an annual pension of between 30-80
percent. Benefits in the NSITF is 30 percent of final average monthly insurable
earnings plus 1.5 percent of those earnings for each 12 months of contributions paid
or credited over the first 120 months. In addition, a contributor obtains a lump-sum
amount equal to final monthly contributions multiplied by the number of months of
contributions. Minimum pension payable is 80 percent of national minimum wage,
while the maximum pension is 65 percent of final average monthly contributions.
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Overview: The main problems of the Nigerian pension system are the fragmentation,
lack of systematic policy on benefits and contributions, and absence of regulation.
One of the problems this gives rise to is the lack of portability, as years of service
accumulated outside of the unified public service are not countable elsewhere, while
in the private sector, pensions are firm-specific. In addition, the ceiling on contribution and benefit result in very low income for pensioners, which is compounded at high
inflation times when the value of pension income is eroded.
The lack of a systematic pension policy sometimes results in pension benefits
being increased by administrative fiat, without serious actuarial analysis of the
financial implications. Such actions usually create fiscal disequilibrium for agencies,
especially in the public sector, with the result that many are not able to meet their
pension obligations.
FiJtally, there is little linkage between benefits and contributions. For example,
period spent in acquiring education is counted towards pension, and with a pension

qualification age of 45, period of on pension income can exceed periods on wage
income in the public service.
In general, the private sector and autonomous agency schemes seem to be well
managed, to the extent that much of the negative publicity of pensioners is that of
public sector pensioners. In addition, the NSITF seems to have overcome some the
shortcomings of the NPF era, and is performing better, within the limits of its enabling
decree. By the time the assets of the NPF were transferred to the NSITF in 1994, it
inherited an organisation with low benefits and contributions, low compliance rate,
poor record-keeping and poor investment policy. The fund seems to have rectified
some of these problems in the short period of its existence. The exposure to
government securities has been greatly reduced, and investment income went up by 17
percent in the first year (See Figure 3). In addition, contribution jumped to 79 percent
in the first year. With adequate legal backing, the fund was able to enforce compliance
and contribution from litigation and warning amounted to 2 percent of total
contributions in 1996.
The major problem observed with the Fund is the low contribution rate, which,
inevitably, results in low benefits. The implication of this is that contribution and
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benefits are not impressive, and the income provided barely exceeds the poverty level.
In addition, the fund· suffers from administrative and management problems. The
Ministry of Labour and Productivity - its supervisory agency - is barely able to
'
supervise effectively. The investment portfolio is too skewed towards real estate; (see
Figure 4) and some equity investments are made in non-publicly quoted companies.
However, the least efficient of the pension schemes in Nigeria is the public
sector scheme. As result of this, government agencies are always at loggerheads with
their pensioners. In addition, because of low public service remuneration, and fact that
the benefits are not indexed, inflation has eroded the real value of retirement income
for a majority of pensioners, and for most of them, pension benefits are not worth the
trip to the pension agency.

FIGURE 4: MEMBERSHIP, INVESTMENT INCOME AND PORTFOLIO OF NSITF
19')4

1995

1996

1997

(In Percent of total investment)
Federal Govt. Stock
Loan Stocks and Debentures
Equities
Bank Deposits
Treasury Instruments
Real Estate

Registered contributors
Contributions Collected***
Benefits Paid•••
Investment Portfolio***

Investment Income***

8.89

25.20
21.27
4.63
7.84
3217

653,257*
151,329,503

n.a.
1,403,753,586
145,120,865

Investment Income / Investment Portfolio
10.3
Source: NSITF Annual Report, various years
• Include former NPF member
•• New registration only

*** In Nigeria Naira

6.21
14,75
21.90
11.41
7.50
38.24

LOI
7.37
33,09
6.86
7.38
44.29

(Units)
128,312**
83,140**
953,970,000
680,290,000
8,814,000,000
6,839,950,000
2,186,410,000
1,775,310,000
332,180,000
161,520,000

9.1

15.2

0.69
4.13
36.19
0.79
0.71
57.16

99,794**
1,115,760.000
15,537,000
3,110,200.00
390,020,000
12.5
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In the light of the above, the-pension schemes with the larger coverage in Nigeria
are not in a position to protect the old and redistribute income amongst the different
economic groups. Indeed, redistribution seems to favour the rich, as some schemes
have contributions based on wage salary alone while benefits are based on terminal
wage salary, plus non-wage cash benefits. The difference between the two sometimes
runs as high as 400 percent of wage salary. Apart from the fact that such a contribution/
benefit ratio is actually infeasible in a fiscally sound system, it encourages the joining
of certain services late so as to take advantage of such generous pensions.
Clearly, the pension systems stand to gain a lot by instituting a comprehensive
multi-pillar system. The issues of retirement age, contribution and benefits have to be
addressed in a more systematic manner, rather than the current ad-hoc methods used.
An increase in retirement age from 45 to 55 in the public sector is long overdue, and
so is an actuarial study of government's pension obligations.
Moreover, the NSITF can be strengthened, to form the mandatory basic pillar,
which will cover all wage earners in the formal sector -public and private-based on a
fully funded defined contribution system. A special scheme can be established for
informal and agricultural sector workers who do not have steady earnings profile, with
proportional pension benefit based on total number of contributions. In addition, the
48,000.00 naira ceiling on contributions should be removed, while benefits should be
in multiplies of the minimum wage. Existing firm-specific pension schemes can form
the basis of a second occupational pillar, to be organized along trade union lines. In this
case, one or two central organisations, like those in France, can be formed to serve as
umbrella organization for the existing firm-based schemes. This should take care of
the problem of portability and ease labour mobility. Finally, private providers of
pension who are currently operating as regular insurance companies can be subjected
to a stricter regulatory environment, in the line with the practice in countries with
private pension providers. Happily, in 1999, a pension reform initiative commenced.
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TUNISIA
Structure: The Tunisian social security system, which ranked as one of the most
advanced in Africa, recently undertook major reforms aimed at improving on the
previous level of coverage, income distribution and job creation. The pension system
is a partially- funded defined-benefit system administered by two main organizations,
the Caisse Nationale de Retraite et de Prevoyance Sociale (CNRPS) which covers all
employees in the public sector, and the Caisse Nationale de Securite Sociale (CNSS)
which covers employees in the private sector. Some of the sub-schemes under CNSS
are the Caisse d' Assurance Viellesse, Invalidite et Survie (CAVIS), which operates seven
schemes for private sector employees, while the Caisse de Prevoyance de Services
Public de L'Electricite, Gaz et du Transport (CREGT) is for employees of public utilities.
Coverage: The CAVIS operates a general scheme that covers employees in the private
sector. In addition, there are six other schemes for self-employed people in the
non-agricultural sector, namely, the basic scheme for agricultural workers, the
improved scheme for agricultural workers, the scheme for independent farmers, and
the scheme for Tunisians overseas. Finally there is a scheme for non-agricultural
employees earning in excess of the minimum wage. CNRPS operates a main scheme
for public sector employees and three schemes for members of government,
parliament and governors. CREGT covers employees in the electric, gas and public
utilities. Eighty-seven percent of participants in all the pension schemes belong to
the CAVIS general scheme and CNRPS. The public sector scheme has a current

coverage of about 700,000 workers. All the private sector schemes under CNSS have
a total membership of 1,100,000.
Funding: Contributions are based on pensionable salary, years of service, a vesting
period and retirement age. As a result, they vary considerably from one scheme to the
other. For the CNSS for example, non-agricultural private sector employees pay 3.25

percent of their earning, while agricultural workers pay l.75 percent of the
agriculture minimum wage or 2.5 percent of earnings. _The employer pays 7 percent of
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earnings. Migrant workers not insured abroad contribute 5 .25 percent. Farmers
contribute 7% of profits, and rton-agricultural self-employed pay 7% of earnings.
Migrant workers not insured abroad contnoott 5.25%. The employer portion of these
contributions are 2.5 percent of payrwl f<;>r non-agricultural self-employed, 3.5
percent of earnings for agricultural workers, plus 4.25 percent deduction in advance to
the social security programme to cover short-term benefits. One of the recent
reforms undertaken by the government was to bear the employer part of the
contributions for newly employed fresh graduates in the private sector for the first
five years. The effect of this was to ease the financial burden of firms as well as
stimulate employment. In 1996, the contribution rate in the CNRPS were increased
from 6 percent to 8.2 percent of salary for the insured and from 14 percent to 13
percent for employers.
Eligibility Requirement: Employee covered by the plan draw pension after the age of
60 or at age 50 with proportional pension, if unemployed for six months for economic
reasons or prematurely aged, provided they have put in fifteen years of service. Public
sector employees can retire at 55 years of age if they have accumulated 35 years of
service. Employees in the public service are expected to have worked for a minimum
of 15 years, 10 years for manual workers in the public service and private sector
employees and 25 years for utility employees. The length of service required for
proportional pension is considerably lower. Full pension is payable at 50 years with
180 months of contribution to working mother of 3 children.
Benefits: The range of benefits varies from scheme to scheme. Private sector
employees get a basic 40 percent of average earning in the last 3 or 5 years (whichever
is higher) plus 5 percent for every 3 months of contribution beyond 120 months. The

maximum pension is 80 percent of earnings, or 6 times the minimum wage, whichever
is higher, while the minimum pension is two-thirds of the minimum wage. Workers
with more than 5 but less than 10 years of contribution obtain proportional pension,
subject to a minimum of 50 percent of the minimum wage. Public sector employees
on the other hand have a maximum pension of 90 percent of gross pensionable income.
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Overview: The Tunisian pension s.ystem is one of the few in the developing world that
is meeting the challenges of old age poverty and income distribution. In the last
decade, effort have been made to reforin the system so as talce care of the problems
1
4
'·
endemic in the old system. Prior to the reforms, the fragmentation of the Tunisian
system created a lot of distortions in the labour market in particular and social policy
in general. Contributions were low relative to benefit, and evasion was rampant. In
addition, there was little coordination between the public and private sector schemes
and poor investment plagued the system, resulting in problems of financial
disequilibrium. Like similar organizations in less developed countries, the funds are
expected to hold a sizeable amount of government instrument in their portfolio, most
of which yield negative rates of return.
Indexation was another problem in Tunisia. In the public sector, pensions are
indexed to wage inflation, thereby protecting against the adverse effect of inflation on

the real value of retirement income. The private sector pension is only indexed to the
minimum wage, i.e minimum pension is at least 2/3 of minimum wage, however, the
. maximum pension does not have such a protection, thereby being susceptible to
erosion by inflation.
However, most of these issues were addressed in the reforms that took place in
the 1990s. For example, the calculation of pension benefit is now based on total salary
and benefits. In addition pensions benefits are now linked to movements in the
prevailing wage. In order to talce care of problem of non-portability, contributions in
CNRPS and CNSS can now be merged. In addition, reforms are undertaken on regular
basis to create balance between contributions, benefits, retirement ages, etc between
the two funds. The effect of the reforms is that coverage increased from 52 percent in
1986 to about 77 percent of the working population in the mid- l 990s. In addition, the
financial health of the funds has improved considerably, with social security services
provided increasing from US$295m US$710m form 1987 to 1986.
Though the two main schemes in Tunisia enjoy financial stability arising from the
reforms, forecasts indicate that things can worsen in the next ten years for several
reasons. In the first place, the change in the calculation of benefits from basic salary to
both basic salary and benefits is bound to exert financial pressure on the funds, as the
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system matures. Secondly, a wave of movement from the public to the private sector
has been on the increase, with the recruitment of a large number of public sector workers into the private sector, most of which are pension eligible. Future reform efforts in
Tunisia should address the issue of regulation and institutional capacity, as well as the
impending system maturation, which if not properly handed will lead to fiscal disequilibrium.
ZAMBIA

Structure: In Zambia, as in most developing countries yet to reform their pension
system, the system is fragmented. The three statutory schemes in operation are the
National Provident Fund (ZNPF), the Civil Service Pension Fund (CSPF) a funded
defined benefits scheme and the Local Authority Superannuation Fund (LASF), a
defined benefits scheme. In addition to these, there are occupational schemes,
separate for each organization but supervised by the Zambia State Insurance
Corporation (ZSIC).

Coverage: More than 500,000 workers, representing about 90 percent of the formal
sector labour force are covered by the three main pension schemes. The ZNPF covers
all private sector employees, agricultural workers, domestic servants in rural areas,
and apprentices. Casual workers, the self-employed and workers in cooperatives are
excluded. Voluntary affiliation is allowed for some categories of rural workers and
others exempted from mandatory coverage. The CSPF provides retirement pensions
to non-contractual civil servants, armed forces and teachers. The LASF covers the
employees of all local authorities, Zambia Electric Supply Corporation, the National
Housing Authority and LASF personnel. In addition to the statutory schemes, there are
other non-statutory schemes, such as ZNIC, which covers mainly the private sector,
and some parastatals and the Mukuba Pension Fund.

Funding: The ZNPF operates as a compulsory retirement savings plan. Employees
pay 5 percent of their earnings per month, while lower rates are applicable to domestic
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workers in the urban areas and others earning less than K67 .5 per day. Employers
contribute 5 percent of the payroll, or higher in the case of low-wage earners. The
maximum monthly contribution on an account cannot exceed Kl5,000.00 a month.
For the CSAF, contribution of 7 .5 percent each are payable monthly by employers and
employees, based on the pensionable monthly salary. The LASF is a defined benefit
plan based on a contribution rate of 10 percent for employees and 23 percent for
employers. The private pension funds managed by ZSIC have contribution rates that
vary, but usually about 12.5 percent from the employer and 6.5 percent from the
employee.
Eligibility Requirements: Contributors to the ZNPF qualify for old-age benefit at age
50 and upon retirement from regular employment, or emigration from Zambia. For
those who joined the Fund before April I, 1973, the respective age is 50 and 45 years.
The civil service pension is based on a retirement age of 55 years, with a minimum of
ten years service. Early retirement at any time within 5 years of retirement age is
permitted, though payment of pension for retirement prior to age 55 is borne by the
government. In the LASF, retirement age was recently reduced from 60 to 55 years,
subject to a minimum of 10 years service. Pension benefit is computed based on the
last annual salary. For most of the private pension scheme, pension age is usually 55
years, and if earlier there is an actuarial benefit reduction.
Overview: As with most less developed countries, the pension system in Zambia has a
low coverage rate. The estimated labour force is 4 million, but combined coverage of
all the scheme is about 12 percent. Apart from the private pension plans run by the
insurance companies, Zambia cannot be said to have a system that successfully
delivers on the goal of providing for retirement. Management problems and
institutional incapacity beset the ZNPF. Required contributions were stagnant from
1966 to 1995, in the face of inflation and serious macroeconomic dislocations. As a
result, the' benefit level has been very low, also partly due to low returns on
investment, inflation and poor administration. The problem is complicated by the
institutional framework, which mandates an investment of at least 50 percent in
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government instruments, and another 35 percent in parastatals, most of which are
non-performing financially. According to a World Bank report, the average annual
1
investment return for the ZNPF was -23.8 percent during 1980-1988 •
The CSPF also suffers from similar fate. Between 1991 and 1997, no
employer's contributions was made by the government. On the contrary, about $186
2
million of its reserves were borrowed by the government . With little scope for
investments, investments in government instruments and real estate dominate the
portfolio. All the funds suffer from low compliance, low investment income,
increasing expenditure and poor administration. Sometimes, benefits are delayed for
up to 1 year, and there are up to 5 years of backlog in updating contributors'
information.
Pension reform in Zambia is long overdue. The provident fund should become an
optional savings plan, which can be converted to an annuity at retirement A
fundamental reform that addresses issues relating to coverage, investment,
membership and benefit administration need to be undertaken.
The problem with the three pension systems reviewed so far is fairly
representative of those of many less developed countries in Africa and Asia. Coverage
is restricted to formal sector employees. Secondly; the demographic pattern is similar
with young, but growing population (see Figure 2). For most countries, the system
commenced in the early l 960's so they are just going through maturation.
Fragmentation also is high and evasion rampant. Contributions and benefits are
mismatched, and the management organizations are beset with administrative problems. Benefits are low, and in addition, retirement age, vesting provisions and portability
regulations do not seem to take cognizance of the real purpose of providing pension
income, thereby creating distortions in the labour market and perverse
mcome
distribution.
Most of these problems can be addressed by changing the rules and regulations
governing pension operations. The real challenge, however, is in building and
sustaining the capacity that will make such reforms succeed. The issue is addressed in
' World Bank (1994)
• SeeQueisser(l997)
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Section V, however, before then, the next section examines the pension system in selected OECD and Latin American countries.

THE PENSION SYSTEM IN OECD AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

France: As in most industrialized countries, France has a multi-pillar pension
system based on public and private coverage, both of which are unfunded. The public
pension plan covers approximately 70 percent of the working population. In addition,
there are special schemes for agricultural, mining, railroad, public utility, public
employees and the self-employed individuals. Membership is voluntary for non-working
housewives and unemployed person caring for invalid family members. The scheme
operates as a PAYG system with the insured paying 1.4 percent of pensionable
earnings, subject to a maximum. Survivor benefits carry an additional 1 percent
contribution. Employers contribute 8.2 percent of payroll. To qualify for benefits,
individuals must be 60 years of age and must have contributed for at least 150 quarters,
with reduced pension payable to those with less than 150 quarters of contribution.
Benefits are usually 150 percent of average earnings in ten highest years after 1947.
The second pillar of pension in France is a complimentary scheme structured
along occupation lines. It is unique in the sense that unlike occupational scheme in
other countries, it is unfunded. The plans are AGIRC (Association Generale des
Institutions de Retraites des Cadres), which covers managerial and technical staff in
the private sector of industry and commerce, and ARRCO, (Association des Regimes
de Retraites Complimentaires), a federation of twenty-six scheme, which covers
non-managerial employees in the same sector. These plans insure three categories of
workers: the self employed (13 percent), state-employed (17 percent) and private
sector employed (70 percent). All private sector employers must insure their workers
in the statutory scheme and contribution is 6.55 percent per employee and 8.20
percent per employer. The schemes provide personal retirement pension, survivor's
pension and reversion rights in the case of death. As with the public pillar, full rate
pension is 50 percent of the average earnings over the last IO years for those having at
least 150 quarters of contributory services. Deductions depend on whether
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contributor is a managerial or non-managerial employee. Pensions are revalued twice
a year by the government having regard to the cost of living. Because participation in
the occupational schemes is mandatory and arranged by collective bargaining,
coverage in one of the highest for any occupational scheme in the world. A third tier of
pension is an optional complimentary scheme, in which contributors may opt to
contribute more than the compulsory minimum rate.
France's system is indexed to the real wage, as it operates through the "points"
system, which is independent of the monetary unit. The pensions are revalued
regularly in accordance with the value of points. This could be once or twice a year, but
is usually tied to the evolution of income of contributors, thereby protecting against
inflation, and making the increase in pension comparable to that of wages.
The administrative cost of the pension schemes is shared between employer and
employee through collective bargaining. The French system has no minimum number
of years of affiliation or residency. Therefore, mobility between different segments of
the labour market is not impaired.

Japan: Like most industrial countries, Japan has a public pension scheme
administered by the national government providing old age, disability and survivor
benefits. The National Pension, which is the public pension scheme, provides basic
mandatory pension coverage to all Japanese citizens. It was originally designed for
those not covered by other existing pension schemes, especially farmers and the selfinsured. Joining is mandatory for all Japanese aged between 20 and 60. Spouses of
employee pension subscribers are required to enroll in the National Pension
programme. In the mid- l 990s, 68.4 million citizens were enrolled, and more that 40
percent depended on it as their sole pension coverage. Insured and employers bear
two-thirds of the cost of benefits, while the national treasury picks up the remainder.
Supplemental coverage is provided by the employees Pension Insurance programme,
which currently covers about 32.0 million private sector employees. The other
supplemental scheme is the Mutual Aid Association pension, which enrolls an
additional 4.9 million public employees and teachers. The cost of the supplemental
plans is usually covered by equal contributions between employer and employee
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proportionate to the employee's wage rate, arid benefits are indexed to net wages.
Retirement age in Japan is 60 for _me'n and 55 for women, and a 40-year contribution
period is required for full pension.
U.K: The public pension in the UK is a PAYG system, incbrporating two schemes,

a flat rate pension and an earning related pension. Retirement age is 65 for men and 60
for women, and 40 years of contribution is required for full pension. The scheme is
financed from contributions made by employer, employee and the self-employed, while
the Government bears the full cost of income-tested pension. Earnings related
pension attracts additional contribution over the basic flat rate pension from employee.
In addition, employers may contract out of the earning related scheme and opt for
private pension instead, provided that the employer scheme is as good as the
government additional pension. As at end of 1996, occupational schemes had about
9.2 million members, and in 1994 - 95, 5.4 million people contracted out of the state
earnings related scheme and took out private pensions. In addition, personal pensions
are available from banks, building societies, insurance companies and other financial
institutions. After the 1977 reforms, over 11 million people belong to occupational
schemes and 5 million to personal pension plans.
The UK system has a pension ombudsman office, which deals with
maladministration and dispute of facts or law. A pension registry also helps to trace
lost benefit. In addition, in 1991, the European Union proposed a new directive on the
freedom of management and investment of funds held by institutions for retirement.
However, this was yet to come into effect as at end- I 997. The Directive sought to
establish common prudential rules for pension fund investing, bearing in mind the diversity of pension system in the European Union and security, quality, liquidity and
profitability of the pension institutions portfolio.
USA: The public scheme in the US is a partially funded system based on a

universal coverage social security system designed to provide income and services to
individuals in the event of retirement. The scheme covers gainful employed
persons, including the self-employed, and it is funded through equal contribution from
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employers and employees, while the government bears the whole cost of
income-tested allowances. The retirement age is 65 for male and female, and 10 years
of contribution is required to qualify for full pension.
In addition to the public pension scheme, occupational schemes abound in the
US, with more than 55 percent of the labour force covered by occupational schemes.
The Federal, states and local governments as well as several employers of labour have
separate pension-plans for their employees. In addition, several provisions in the tax
law permit the self-employed and employees not covered by private plans, to establish
pension plans for themselves with tax advantages similar to those given to corporate
pension plans.
.
Pension Funds are highly regulated in the USA. The Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides basic protection for the individual for
money invested in private pension schemes, while public plans are subject to the laws
of the state or local governments where they operate. Operators of pension funds have
important fiduciary duties regarding the choice of pension. investment, and there are
limitations to the extent to which plans can hold speculative investment. Participants
are to be provided with disclosure statements that describe the plans' benefits and
investment objectives, and pension funds are required to submit to the Department of
Labour an annual report, which includes detailed balance sheet and investment
schedule. Finally, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, created by ERISA
guarantees a portion of the retirement benefit of a vested employee in a defined
benefits plan.
Argentina: By the end of the 1970s, the Argentine pension system was the
oldest and most mature scheme in South America, with high coverage, evasion and

increasing dependency ration. By the turn of the decade, defaults on pensioner
obligation were rampant and most of the initial attempts made at reforming the system
were more concerned with managing the problem rather changing the system. These
include increasing the retirement age so as to reduce financial obligations, and tightening eligibility requirements. However, following the successful implementation of
the Chilean pension reform, a reform that allowed the co-existence of private and

52
public schemes was introduced.
The first pillar of the Argentine pension system is the public pension scheme,
which is operated as a PAYG system. It provides a basic pension and contribution is
mandatory. The reformed pension scheme offered employees the option to move from
the public PAYG, which was a defined benefits scheme to a private, fully funded contributory scheme with individual accounts. Enrolment is mandatory in either of the
two, and members who do not choose were automatically placed in the private scheme.
In any'of the schemes, the retirement age is 60 for male and 65 for female, and a thirtyyear work life is required before the minium pension can be received.
The private pension pillar is very close to that of Chile, which seems to have set
the pace for the continent. 3.5 percent of contribution goes to the managing firm,
while the government guarantees a minimum pension, which translates to about 40
percent of average wages over a working life of 30 years. The performance of the
scheme after reforms seems encouraging as about 50 percent of private sector
employees enrolled within the first year. It is particularly attractive to the younger
generation.
Chile: The reform of the Chilean pension system was informed by the fact that
the old publicly managed, benefit-determined scheme was unable to achieve the planned
benefits level and national coverage. In addition, it was beset with a crisis of
credibility, which eventually led to its abandonment, and replacement by a government
mandated and regulated but privately administered, individually capitalized,
contribution-determined system.
Under the new system, all private and public civilian wage earners must belong
except those who opt for the old arrangement. Past contributions in the old public
system were carried into the new system as a premium in the form of treasury bonds.
Contribution is 10 percent of insured wages for pension and an additional 2.5-3.7 percent for disability and survivors benefits. There are no state or employer contribution
allowed. The managing company called Administrators de Fondos de Pensiones, (AFP)
deducts commission and invests the proceed in a separate account for each worker. All
benefits, annuities and pension are denominated in "UF' a reference unit whose value
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is adjusted daily according to the Consumer Prii.e Index (the CPI). At retirement, some
of the saving may be withdrawn in iump-sum provided contribution has been for at le~t
10 years and there is enough in the sayi11gs account to provide for a pension equal to, at
least 12 percent of average wages of lO'Years prior. The state guarantee a minimum
pension for those who have at least 20 year of contribution, have reached retirement
age, but whose account can only support less than 22-25 percent of the average wage.
One of the more remarkable things about the Chilean system is the tight
regulatory environment that the AFPs operate. Regulation is the responsibility of the
Superintendents de Administdoras de Fondos de Pensiones (SAFP). There are detailed
regualtions governing operations, audit and financial reporting of the private pension
companies. Assets and liabilities of the company and those of contributors are to be
completely separated.
In addition to general supervision of operations and provision of guidelines, the
investment of AFPs is strictly monitored. The credit rating of financial instruments is
used to determine the eligibility of a security for investment by a private pension fund.
Since 1988, when the Chilean government made it compulsory that all publicly
offered securities be rated by at least two private rating agenc_ies, only high quality
issues are eligible for investment. The government also ensured the adequacy of the
rating service. In the event of bankruptcy of an AFP, members contributions are
guaranteed by the state.
The reforms can be said to be successful in all the relevant areas. In the first
place, coverage is much better than before, with 93 percent of the formal sector
workforce being covered by private pension. With respect to benefits, these were
higher than the pre-reform days with 40 percent difference.

COMPARISON OF PENSION SYSTEMS
The twin objectives of pension income have been brought out clearly in the above
analysis of the pension system in OECD and Latin American countries. Public pension
system, co-existing with private earning related plans are able to satisfy both the
objectives of income replacement and redistribution through both means-tested and
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defined-contribution pension. Jointly, they constitute vital instruments for ·poverty
alleviation. In addition to that, pension funds are significant participants in t!Je capital
market, contributing to the deepening of the financial system. In Chile, after the
reforms of the 1980s, private pension plans grew rapidly, with this value totaling
US$22.3 billion or 43 percent of the GDP by mid-year 1994 and the savings rate
increasing from 16.7 percent of the GDP pre-reform to 26.6 per cent of GDP postreform.
In the US, pension fund is the largest institutional investor group. Between 1950
and 1994, funds operated by private plans grew from US$17 billion to about US$4.7
trillion. Currently, they own more than 25 percent of the total corporate stocks
outstanding. Similarly, in the UK, pension funds accounts for close to 30 percent of
securities on the London Stock Exchange in 1996, while the total British pension fund
assets was 566 billion pounds.
The implication is that properly managed pension schemes can serve as financial
intermediaries for the mobilization of capital on behalf of small savers. To the extent
that they contribute to growth and development of the capital market, pension reforms
have positive effects on financial market deepening. According to James (1997) after
the reforms in Switerland, the national savings rate rose from 6 to 8.5 percent of GDP
in the decade after the funded second pillar becoming mandatory and the entire increase occurred in pension funds and related institutions.
These facts are instructive for the design of an efficient pension system in a
developing country. Most advanced countries have higher percentage of aging
population (see Figure 1), a fact that creates fiscal disequilibrium in most PAYG
systems. Though the expectation of adverse demographic trends have often shaped
pension debates in these countries, for developing countries, the issue are likely to be
different, since demographic µends are relatively favourable. The focus of attention
has to be directed to building the capacity to make reforms successful. This is the next
issue examined.
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CONCLUSION: BUILDING THE CAPACITY FOR SUCCESSFUL PENSION
REFORMS
In comparing the experiences of OECD and Latin American countries with those
of Africa countries, three main issues stand out.
In the first place, the dynamics of the Africa labour market, with the coexistence
of formal and informal sectors imply that formal income policy can only apply to a
limited percentage of the population. Secondly, existing pension schemes are beset
with institutional problems, and they lack administrative and technical capacity for
efficient pension administration. Finally, the macroeconomic environment is relatively
unstable, with important reforms in tax administration and financial markets yet to be
undertaken. In the light of these, the focus of the following recommendations will be
on formal sector, informal sector, the role of the government, and building the
capacity for reforms.
Formal sector pensions should be built around a multi-pillar system with contributions very closely linked to benefits, which should be indexed to the minimum wage.
The first pillar should be a publicly mandated but privately managed scheme with
mandatory coverage of formal sector employees, financed with contributions from
employers and employees. The short to medium term reality in most African countries
rules out any system that has to be financed from taxation. This is mainly because of
the lack of efficient tax administration and transparency. In addition, the national budget
may be overburdened by such a task. Rather, a fully contributory system in the short
term, with the scope for the inclusion of means-tested programme in the Jong term is
suggested. This can be easily achieved by turning the existing general scheme into the
first pillar, and many countries can build on existing social insurance scheme or the
provident fund. The advantage of a scheme that is not financed partly by government
revenue is that since such a scheme can only be limited to the formal sector, governmenttransfer payment means that those not covered by the scheme are subsidizing the
covered; a situation of perverse income distribution.
The second pillar should be structured along occupational lines. Many countries
have occupation schemes, what is lacking is centralized organization, to which all
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firms. Regulation is also relatively easier than dealing with several private sector firms.
The third pillar should be that of personal savings and pension investment. Though
the scope for investment is limited in some countries, they are already in wide usage in
other countries, and there is no reason why they cannot be more useful. In this regard,
provident funds can still serve some purpose. Though they operate on the principle of
lump-sum payment, which may not be available to provide for long-term retirement
income, but, as is the practice in Chile, provident fund contributors may be given the
option to purchase annuity with their lump-sum benefit. With the multi-pillar system
specified, most employees in the formal sector will have adequate coverage and
benefits in old age.
For informal sector employees, the possibilities are limited. There is little or no
capacity for schemes based on personal contributions, as incomes are either very low
or non-wage, and cannot therefore be the basis of generating long-term savings. Even
if there is the ability to contribute, evasion is high in the informal sector. The lack of
efficient tax administration rules out means-tested programme financed from general
revenue. Poverty targeting amongst the old in this group therefore has to follow a
gradual approach. In the short to medium-term, governments could initiate policies
that improve their working conditions and, therefore, income. Complimentary
policies that target root causes of poverty such as lack of useful education, health care,
employment should always be at the top of social policy agenda. In the meantime,
traditional institutions that take care of the old such as the extended family system, and
religious obligations can be strengthened through appropriate policies. In the long term
however, the goal should be the pursuance of polices that generate employment and
economic growth, which will draw the labour force away from the informal sector.
The role of government is very critical to the realization for these objectives.
Governments have to pursue macroeconomic policies that will guarantee stability in
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the financial and labour markets. These include fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and
labour market policies. For example, the fiscal implication of pension reforms is very
important. Even if there is no tax-financed scheme, some of the changes that will come
with pension reform will require fiscal discipline from the government. Pension
agencies will no longer be required to finance the government's deficit through the
purchase of treasury instruments at negative interest rates. In addition, government
will no longer be able to treat its (employer) contributions as mere expenses in the
budget, which may or may not be met, but as any other insurable risk, underwritten by
an insurance company. All these require a lot of discipline and transparency, which
may not currently be the norm.
The most important task is that of regulating the schemes. The first in this regard
will be the replacement of ad hoc changes of the past with fundamental reforms. During the transition period, extensive regulations will be required for coverage, retirement age, years of contribution, vesting, benefit administration and provision for workers
in the previous system. In addition, new institutions will have to be set up, with clear
requirements about capitalization, investment responsibilities and financial reporting.
All regulatory policies will be undertaken based on existing realities and future
possibilities.
Whereas it is easier to identify the issues and set out rules and regulations, often
the most difficult aspect of social policy reform is the extent of local capacity to
manage those reforms. An efficient pension system must be able to handle problems
of compliance, communication with regions, record keeping and delivering the
benefits, mostly in real time. Extensive information and statistics will be required
about labour and financial market conditions. These cannot be efficiently handled without
some degree of technical know-how, administrative and management capacity, which
may currently be lacking. In addition, regulatory agencies may lack the technical
manpower to supervise effectively. Progress in these areas will therefore be
incremental. In the long term, governments will have to make substantial investments
in human capital, while in the short term; training of current employees locally and
through technical aid programme might be beneficial.
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The effect of pension reform on income growth and distribution in instructive.
Apart from the direct effect of providing income at old age, there are other advantage
that, in the long run, contribute to increase in income for various groups. One of these
is through the effect on labour markets. In an economy with less than full employment,
an efficient and transparent pension system leads to increases in employment in the
formal sector, where suppliers of labour will prefer to work so as to qualify for
pension income. Secondly, through its effect on financial deepening, pension funds
increase the stock of financial savings, which are available for investment, and impacts
positively on growth.
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